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TOBACCO LITIGATION'S THIRD-WAVE:
HAS JUSTICE GONE UP IN SMOKE?
DAVID

I.

A. HYvAN*

INTRODUCTION

Tobacco offers a target-rich environment for academic scholarship. A non-exhaustive list would include the conduct of the tobacco
companies and their attorneys; the extraordinary sums earned by certain members of the plaintiffs bar as a result of their participation in
the suits brought by the various attorneys general (the "Medicaid
suits"); the cozy arrangements between those same members of the
plaintiffs bar and the state attorneys general who picked them to participate in the Medicaid suits; the terms of settlement of the Medicaid
suits; the decision by a state court judge in Minnesota to order the
release of tens of thousands of tobacco company documents despite
claims of attorney-client privilege; the theft and disclosure of
thousands of confidential Brown & Williamson documents by a paralegal (who subsequently had a house bought for him by a prominent
plaintiffs lawyer); the political battle between Democrats and Republicans over a federal tobacco bill; the decision by President Clinton to
offer a budget which was balanced only if the federal government imposed taxes totaling approximately $65 billion over five years on tobacco; the unprecedented role played by public health professionals
in the framing of public policy with regard to tobacco; the assertion of
regulatory authority over tobacco by the FDA; the propriety and constitutionality of restrictions on smoking in the workplace and cigarette
advertising; the scope of preemption of tort litigation because cigarettes bear federally mandated warning labels (and the irony that the
warning labels have turned out to be the best defense the tobacco
companies have going); the marketing of tobacco products through
"product placement" in movies; the price elasticity of tobacco among
various groups; the regressive nature of excise taxes on tobacco; the
ethics of investment in tobacco companies; the paradoxical nature of
our nation's policies towards tobacco, which encourages consumption
on the one hand (by subsidizing growers and prying open overseas
markets), and discourages consumption on the other (by requiring
* Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. The analysis in this article focuses on the policy aspects of primary tobacco use. I appreciate the helpful comments of Bob Condlin and Peter Jacobson.
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warning labels, and prohibiting advertising on television); and last but
by no means least, the dramatic change in norms regarding smoking.
Any one of these subjects would justify its own symposium, and
some of them are addressed by the other participants in this symposium. I focus instead on two narrow issues: the extent to which the
state Medicaid programs have actually suffered any damages from the
use of cigarettes by Medicaid beneficiaries, and the "pediatricizing" of
tobacco policy. The first point deserves analysis because it casts considerable doubt on the merits of the claims with which the states are
seeking to extract hundreds of billions of dollars from the tobacco
companies. The second point illustrates analogous conduct in another forum, as anti-smoking advocates seek to avoid a debate over the
merits of their "reform" by packaging the issue as one involving safety
and well being of children. Both points make clear that it is not just
the tobacco companies that are in trouble. In our zeal to address the
legacy of tobacco, we should be careful that it is not justice that goes
up in smoke.
II.

THE THIRD WAVE OF TOBACCO LITIGATION: THE MEDICAID SUITS

A.

A Short History of Tobacco Litigation

Most scholars divide litigation against the tobacco companies into
three waves. The first wave was from 1954 to 1973, and involved theories of deceit, breach of express and implied warranties, and negligence.' The second wave was from 1983 to 1992, and involved these
theories, as well as failure to warn and strict liability. 2 Both the first
and second wave involved the claims of individual smokers. In both of
these waves,, the tobacco companies maintained that its products were
not harmful, and that smokers had assumed the risk of smoking, or
were contributorily negligent.3 These defenses, along with a "take-noprisoners" strategy of litigating, proved a near-invulnerable shield.4
1. See Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective
Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POLY REV.63, 71 (1997).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Morality Play's Third Act: Revisiting Addiction, Fraud and
Consumer Choice in "Third Wave" Tobacco Litigation, 46 K.- .L. REv. 465, 471 (1998) ("The
assumption of risk defense has 'hovered like a storm cloud over every smoker's claim
against the tobacco companies,' leading to victory after victory for the tobacco industry in
hundreds of lawsuits brought by smokers."). The litigating strategy of the tobacco companies was outlined by a tobacco lawyer as follows: "The aggressive posture we have taken
regarding depositions and discovery in general continues to make these cases extremely
burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs' lawyers... [T]o paraphrase General Patton, the
way we won these cases was not by spending all of [our client's] money, but by making that
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The third wave involves both class action suits brought on behalf of
smokers in individual states, and "Medicaid suits," brought on behalf
of state Medicaid programs, to recover the amounts they incurred for5
medical and nursing home care for illnesses attributable to smoking.
Although it is too early to assess the impact of the class action and
individual suits, the Medicaid suits have met with extraordinary success. 6 The tobacco companies settled with four states (Mississippi,
Florida, Texas, and Minnesota) for approximately $36 billion, and
then agreed on a global settlement which ultimately foundered in
Congress.' Talks are currently underway to settle the remaining Medi8
caid suits.
B.

Some Background on Medicaid and the Medicaid Suits

Medicaid is a joint state-federal program which provides funding
for medical and nursing home care for the poor.9 Depending on the
state, between 50% and 78% of Medicaid funding comes from the
federal government.1 a The states have limited authority to tailor the
states, Medicaid is
Medicaid program to their own needs.1" For many
2
budgets.1
their
on
program
largest
second
the
In 1994, the state of Mississippi initiated the first Medicaid suit
against the tobacco industry.1 3 Frustrated that the tobacco companies
had consistently won every case brought by a smoker, a plaintiff's lawother son of a bitch spend all his." Haines v. Ligget Group, Inc., 814 F.Supp. 414, 421
(D.NJ. 1993).
5. See Cupp, supra note 4, at 468-470.
6. See id. at 469.

7. See Big Tobacco, Attorneys General Take Another Shot at Settlement, STAR TRIBUNE NEWS28, 1998, at 4A; see also, Barry Meier, Settlement May be Near in

PAPER OF THE TWIN CITIES, July

8 States Tobacco Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1998, at 26.
8. See id.
9. See e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program:A Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855 passim (1990).
10. See id. at 860.
11. See Trish Riley, Medicaid: The Role of the States, 274JAMA 267, 267 (1995).
12. See RichardJ. Manski et al., Medicaid, Managed Care, and America's Health Safety Net,

25 J. L.

MED.

& ETHICS 30 (1997).

During the past decade, Medicaid has experienced extraordinary growth, in both
number of beneficiaries and total expenditures. Between 1988 and 1993, the number of
Medicaid beneficiaries grew from 22 million to 32 million. while the number of Medicaid
beneficiaries increased by 45 percent, expenditures increased by 145 percent, from $51
billion to $125 billion. Expressed in terms of its percentage of state budgets, Medicaid
doubled from 10 percent to 20 percent over the same time period, to the point that it is
currently the second largest budget item for most states.
Id. at 30; see also Riley, supra note 11, at 268.
13. See Michael C. Moore & Charles J. Mikhail, A New Attack on Smoking Using an Old
Time Remedy, 111 PuB. HEALTH REP. 192, 197 (1996).
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yer in Mississippi hit on the idea of having the state Medicaid program
sue the tobacco companies for the costs associated with treating Medicaid beneficiaries for smoking-related illnesses.' 4 This strategy had
the singular advantage of replacing an obviously blameworthy plaintiff
with an entity which had never smoked, but footed the bill for people
who did. 5 The lawyer was a personal friend of the Attorney General
of Mississippi, and persuaded him to file suit against the tobacco companies on behalf of the state of Mississippi. 6 Almost forty states fol17
lowed suit in short order.
In an attempt to avoid the impact of the doctrine of subrogation
(which would have subjected the state to all the defenses which could
have been raised against an individual smoker), most states pursued
equitable actions against the tobacco companies.1 " Two states (Florida and Massachusetts) filed claims pursuant to newly enacted statutes
which authorized direct action against the tobacco companies, and
stripped the tobacco companies of their traditional defenses.' 9 In
Maryland, a statute was enacted to authorize such litigation after the
state judge before whom the case was pending refused to accept the
Attorney General's position that the state had a non-statutory (common law and equitable) right to proceed against the tobacco
companies. 20
14. See id. at 194.
15. See Cupp, supra note 4, at 476 (noting that the Medicaid suits "seek to minimize the
assumption of risk argument. By bringing the lawsuits on behalf of the states rather than
the smokers themselves, state attorneys general hope to focus juries away from smokers'
blameworthiness.").
16. The Attorney General of Mississippi offers a spirited defense of his tactics in Moore
& Mikhail, supra note 13.
17. Cupp, supra note 4, at 476.
18. See Cliff Sherrill, Tobacco Litigation: Medicaid Third Party Liability and Claimsfor Restitution, 19 U. ARK. LI-rLE ROCK L.J. 497, 500-09 (1997) (reviewing suits and causes of
action).
19. See Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910(1) (stripping defendants of all "affirmative defenses normally available," including "assumption of risk.");
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 118E, § 22 (West 1998) and 1994 Mass. Acts, ch. 60, 276. See also
Elizabeth A. Frohlich, Note, Statutes Aiding States'Recovery of Medicaid Costs from Tobacco Companies: A Better Strategy for Redressing an Identifiable Harm?, 21 AM. J. L. & MED. 445, 445
(1995) ("In 1994, Florida and Massachusetts passed legislation enabling the states to bring
suit against the tobacco industry to recover Medicaid costs of treating smoking-related
illnesses.").
Most of the Florida statute was upheld in Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated
Indus., 678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996). A federal district court abstained from ruling on the
Massachusetts law, but noted that one possible characterization was that it provided a "species of subrogation right, perhaps not one subject to traditional subrogation defenses." See
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 946 F.Supp. 1067, 1077-78 (D.Mass. 1996).
20. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN §15-120 (1994 and 1997 Supp.).
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Are There Any Damages?

The claim that the state Medicaid programs incurred damages
for which the tobacco companies should be held to answer is problematic. Even if one refrains from smoking, immortality (and no medical bills) is not an option."' The Medicaid program incurs expenses
whether or not its beneficiaries smoke; the relevant question is the
incremental cost attributable to smoking. Assessing the incremental
cost attributable to smoking requires consideration of two elements:
timing and magnitude.2 2 If beneficiaries incur medical expenses
sooner because they smoke, the Medicaid program incurs a proportionately greater expense because of the time value of money. If beneficiaries die more expensively or incur greater medical expenses
because they smoke, the Medicaid program incurs a greater expense
as well. Although it is clear that some percentage of smokers die
sooner than would otherwise be the case, it is considerably less obvious that they do so more expensively.2 3 There is a good case that the
Medicaid program did not incur any incremental expense as a result
of smoking. If one factors in excise taxes and foregone pensions and
Social Security, the state and federal governments actually appear to
24
come out substantially ahead on smoking.
21. SeeJane Gravelle & Dennis Zimmerman, The Marlboro Math: Forget the Cigarette Tax
Hike, Smokers Already Pay Their Share, WASH. PosT, June 5, 1994, at C1 (stating, "The alternative to death from a smoking-related illness is not immortality and perfect health - it is later
death, and perhaps from a more costly illness.").
22. For purposes of simplicity, I assume that the number of Medicaid beneficiaries is
not affected by the incidence of smoking. However, if smoking-related illnesses killed people before they qualified for Medicaid, the number of beneficiaries would decrease. Conversely, if smoking-related illnesses exhausted one's private insurance before death
supervened, the number of Medicaid beneficiaries would increase. The effect on the incremental costs of the Medicaid program will depend on the direction and magnitude of
this vector.
23. CompareJan J. Barendregt et. al., The Health Care Costs of Smoking, 337 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1052, 1052 (1997) ("Health care costs for smokers at a given age are as much as 40
percent higher than those for nonsmokers, but in a population in which no one smoked
the costs would be 7 percent higher among men and 4 percent higher among women than
the costs in the current mixed population of smokers and nonsmokers.) andJANE G. GRAVELLE & DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, CIGARETTE TAXES TO FUND HEALTH CARE REFORM: AN EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. No. 94-214 E., at 51-54 (Mar. 8, 1994) (concluding
that smokers have lower lifetime medical expenses than nonsmokers), with Willard G. Manning et al., The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers and Drinkers Pay Their Own Way?, 261 JAMA 1604,
1604 (1989) (concluding that smokers have higher lifetime medical expenses than
nonsmokers).
24. See Christopher May, Smoke and Mirrors: Florida's Tobacco-Related Medicaid Costs May
Turn Out to Be a Mirage, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1061, 1076-83 (1997); Laura Mansnerus, Making a
Case For Death, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1996, § 4 at 1. But seeJon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The
Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Casefor Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163,
1236-54 (1998) (arguing that other economic models of smoking-related costs understate

1998]

TOBACCO LITIGATION'S THIRD-WAVE

Why, then, are the tobacco companies so eager to settle the Medicaid suits? Isn't the fact that the tobacco companies are willing to pay
such astronomical sums to settle these cases proof that there are damages? Unfortunately, willingness to pay is not necessarily indicative of
the merits of the case. The performance of the tort system in comparable high profile cases (e.g., cases involving unsympathetic defendants and products for which causation is difficult to prove) does not
suggest thatjudges and juries will let the merits matter. 2 5 More generally, because the Medicaid suits were designed to strip the tobacco
companies of their traditional (and so-far virtually bulletproof) defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence, the willingness of the tobacco companies to settle indicates only that the
defendants know a lynch mob when they see one.
The extent to which the tobacco companies are viewed as a piggy
bank and the Medicaid suits as a tool with which to pry them open was
demonstrated by a question from the audience when the papers in
this symposium issue were presented. A well-meaning law student
wondered why the major plaintiff's firms who were prosecuting the
costs and overstate benefits); Moore & Mikhail, supra note 13, at 200-01 (arguing that it is
"ghoulish" to suggest that smoking saves the state money on foregone medical expenses
and pensions).
25. Consider Agent Orange, breast implants, and Bendectin. In each of these mass
exposure tort cases the correlation between exposure and injury was weak, but defendants
ended up paying large sums of money.
In the Agent Orange case, the plaintiffs-more than two million Vietnam War veterans who were exposed to Agent Orange, the veteran's wives, and their children-brought
suit against seven chemical companies that manufactured the toxic chemical. See generally
PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986) [hereinafter Agent Orange On Trial];
see also Peter H. Schuck, The Role ofJudges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent OrangeExample,
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337, 342 (1986). The parties settled the case just hours before jury
selection was scheduled to begin. See Agent Orange On Trial at 164. Although the plaintiffs' proof of causation was fatally flawed, the defendants settled the case for $180 million
while under strong pressure from the judge. Id. at 165. The defendants were concerned
that a jury would be pro-plaintiff, the case would bring negative publicity to the manufacturers of the chemical, there would be costly appeals, and the expense of going to trial
would exceed the benefits of potential victory. See generally id. at 143-167.
In the silicon breast implant litigation, the defendant, Dow Corning Corporation, paid
more than three million dollars to the plaintiffs-tens of thousands of women who had
claimed that the implants caused them illness-despite the fact that numerous scientific
studies revealed no such correlation between the implants and the women's conditions.
See Gina Kolata, In Implant Case, Science and the Law Have Different Agendas, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 1998, at A2; Michael Higgins, Mass Tort Makeover, 84 A.B.A.J. 53 (Nov. 1998).
In the case of Bendectin, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals faced a number of lawsuits
beginning in 1980. Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in
the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1, 13 (1993). Once again, the plaintiffs-individuals
who claimed that the anti-nausea drug caused them to suffer birth defects-lacked any
substantial evidence to support causation. See id. at 27. Nonetheless, juries held the defendants liable and awarded the plaintiffs significant money damages. See id. at 2.

40

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAw

&

POLICY

[VOL. 2:34

Medicaid suits could not "share the wealth" by including some minority-run law firms in the litigation. Have things gotten so bad that the
Medicaid suits are actually viewed as a public works project?2 6
III.

TEENAGERS AND TOBACCO POLICY

In the past few years, domestic and foreign policy have been
pediatricized. As Charles Krauthammer has accurately noted,
Once upon a time, a politician would promise to do anything
- abolish taxes, hold back the tides, run over his grandmother - in the name of the "working man." Not anymore.
Nowadays everything is done in the name of "families" or,
better still, for "children." From Iraq to gun control, from
global warming to air bags, there is nary a public policy issue
that is not sold as a way to protect kids.2 7
Tobacco is perhaps the most stunning achievement of pediatricization. Although teenagers make up approximately 2% of smokers, the
rhetoric of tobacco reform has focused entirely on children - particularly since David Kessler, the then-Commissioner of the Food & Drug
Administration branded smoking a pediatric disease. 28 An anti-tobacco speech by President Clinton "invoked children no fewer than
34 times in 21 minutes - a new indoor record. '29 It is no accident
that the major anti-smoking advocacy group is the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids.3 °
There is a certain surface plausibility to the pediatricizing of tobacco policy, since most long-term smokers begin smoking when they
are teenagers. 3 ' However, tobacco kills adults, not children, and does
so only after a lifetime of smoking.3 2 Thus, a reduction in smoking
saves the lives of children only in the most attenuated of senses. More
26. I note, as I did at the conference, the likely difficulties of persuading the Fourth
Circuit that such a program meets the exacting standards which must be proven tojustify a
race-based quota.
27. Charles Krauthammer, It's For the Kids, WASH. POST, May 8, 1998, at A31. See also
Ann Hulbert, Be Fruitful and Subtract, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1998, § 7 at 11, 14 ("It has become a bipartisan habit to turn vexing public problems into child-centered causes whenever possible. Poverty, health care policy, budget priorities, tobacco companies: the list of
issues we must address out of concern for the fate of children keeps growing.").
28. Krauthammer, supra note 27, at A31. ("Dr. David A. Kessler, the Commissioner of
Food and Drugs, said today that smoking was fundamentally a pediatric disease because
most addiction to tobacco begins among teenagers, and outlined steps to combat the
problem.").
29. See id.
30. See Who We Are (visited Sept. 29, 1998) <http://www.tobaccofreekids.org>.
31. See Kelder & Daynard, supra note 1, at 63-65.
32. See id.
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to the point, the logic of restricting smoking (and other hazardous
forms of behavior) to adults is that we believe those who are underage
are incapable of making rational decisions about such matters. However, teenagers appear to substantially overestimate the hazards of
smoking.3 3 As such, the case for paternalism is less than compelling.
If we focus on means instead of ends, the centerpiece of virtually
all proposals to prevent teenage smoking has been a hefty increase in
the tax imposed on all cigarettes. Leave aside the question of the elasticity of demand for cigarettes among teenagers (including the inconvenient fact that teenage smokers do not seem to favor lower-priced
generic cigarettes)." Leave aside as well the probability of a flourishFinally,
ing black market in cigarettes if such taxes are imposed.
ignore the fact that it is already unlawful for those under 18 to
purchase cigarettes. 36 Instead, focus your attention on the fact that
33. W. Kip Viscusi, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 129 (1992) ("[T]he youngest
age cohort has a high risk perception and is more likely to overestimate the risk than the
population at large, which reflects this group's substantial reliance on recently provided
information pertaining to the smoking risks.... [T]here is no evidence of younger consumers being lured into smoking in any disproportionate matter.").
34. Kelder & Daynard, supra note 1, at 66 ("Camel, Marlboro, and Newport - the three
most heavily advertised brands of cigarettes - are smoked by 86% of the teenage market.").
35. More than a hundred years ago, Adam Smith noted the predictable consequence
of excess taxation of a product:
The high duties which have been imposed upon the importation of many different sorts of foreign goods, in order to discourage their consumption in Great
Britain, have in many cases served only to encourage smuggling; and in all cases
have reduced the revenue of the customs below what more moderate duties
would have afforded. The saying of Dr. Swift, that in the arithmetic of the customs two and two, instead of making four, make sometimes only one holds perfectly true with regard to such heavy duties....
ADAM SMITH, 2 THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 411 (Edwin Cannan ed., University of Chicago
Press 1976) (1776).
A few commentators have suggested that such a black market is unlikely:
Critics of the industry contend, however, that a black market could develop only
if the tobacco companies help fuel it... Industry critics also note that when the
tobacco industry agreed to a 65-cent-per-pack tax increase contained in the 1997
settlement, they weren't worrying about a black market. Now that a $1.10 increase is on the table, the companies, according to John McCain's chief tobacco
negotiator, John Raidt, 'are yelling about black markets and murder and mayhem
and beating up working people. They never said anything when it was 65 cents.'
Jeffrey Goldberg, Big Tobacco's Endgame, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1998, § 7 at 36, 62. However,
it is unclear why the relationship between smuggling and excise tax rates should be linear.
Cf George Stigler, The Economist as Preacher, in THE ECONOMIST AS PREACHER AND OTHER
ESSAYS 4 (1982) (stating, "if on first hearing a passage of [Adam Smith's] you are inclined
to disagree, you are reacting inefficiently; the correct response is to say to yourself: I wonder where I went amiss.").
36. In addition, the FDA had decreed that everyone under 27 years of age must be
carded before they can purchase cigarettes. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products to Protect Children and Adoles-
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we are prepared to tax 100% of consumers to keep cigarettes out of
the hands of the 2% that are underage. This massive disjunction between means and ends is neither necessary nor proper - even in a
case involving the protection of minors. Indeed, the magnitude of the
disjunction between means and ends is the surest indication that mischief is afoot.3 7 In a case involving a strikingly similar strategy, the
Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma statute which allowed women to buy near-beer at the age of 18, but required men to be 21.38
The state defended the statute on the grounds that it was appropriate
to impose "a restraint on 100% of the males in the class allegedly because about 2% of them have probably violated one or more laws relating to the consumption of alcoholic beverages."3 " Justice Stevens
tartly observed, "it does not seem to me that an insult to all of the
young men of the State can be justified by visiting the sins of the 2%
on the 98%."" o
So what should be done to prevent underage smoking? For the
sake of simplicity, let us limit our focus to the use of excise taxes.4 1
cents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44396-45318 (1996); Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution
of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products to Protect Children and Adolescents, 60
Fed. Reg. 41313-41375 (1995). However, the Fourth Circuit recently held the FDA lacked
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food &
DrugAdmin., Nos. 97-1604, 97-1581, 97-1606, 97-1614, 97-1605, 1998 WL 473320, at *1 ( 4 h
Cir. 1998).
37. As Professor Balkin has noted:
The rationale of every governmental action almost always has a nice version and a
naughty version; inquiry using such proxies as means-ends fit is important, for the
real legislative purpose is not always easily determined otherwise. A poor fitting
of means to ends is the surest sign that the legislature's stated goals are not its real
goals, and that the bill disguises some unseemly machination or invidious
prejudice.
Jack M. Balkin, The Footnote,83 Nw. U.L. REv. 275, 291 (1989). Those who remain in doubt
whether the nice or naughty version predominates should consider the fee fight which has
broken out in Florida and Texas. SeeJohn Gibeaut, GettingBurned, 84 A.B.A.J. 42, 42 (Sept.
1998) (hereinafter Getting Burned); John Gibeaut, Billion Dollar PR Lesson is Snipe Publicly,
Pay Privately, 84 A.B.A.J. 56, 56 (Sept. 1998).
38. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
39. Id. at 214 (Stevens, J., concurring).
40. Id.
41. Of course, there are a variety of non-financial strategies available as well, such as
advertising, educational programs, and increased enforcement of existing laws although there are good reasons to wonder about the cost-effectiveness and prospects for
success of such strategies. See, e.g., Nancy Rigotti et al., The Effect of Enforcing Tobacco-Sales
Laws on Adolescents'Access to Tobacco and Smoking Behavior,337 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1044, 1044
(1997) ("enforcing tobacco-sales laws improved merchants' compliance and reduced illegal sales to minors but did not alter adolescents' perceived access to tobacco or their smoking."); Stanton A. Glantz, Preventing Tobacco Use - The Youth Access Trap, 86 Am. J. PUB.
HEALTH 156, 157 (1996) (complaining that focusing tobacco control efforts on underage
smokers is likely to be ineffective).
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There are certainly ways in which excise taxes can be used to decrease
underage smoking without creating a pot of money for balancing the
federal budget, eliminating the marriage penalty, enriching the plaintiffs' bar, and financing a host of new government programs. Consider two strategies. Why not impose a tax in the specified amount on
all cigarette sales, but make the tax refundable as long as the tax seal
is turned in by someone who is over 18? Alternatively, eliminate the
prohibition on sales to teenagers, but impose a substantial tax on such
sales, and give retailers the incentive to price discriminate by allowing
them to keep a portion of the resulting taxes. Each of these proposals
has its own mix of advantages and disadvantages (including the likelihood of straw purchasers), but both avoid the imposition of a tax
which misses its intended target 98% of the time.
IV.

CONCLUSION

One need not be an enthusiast of tobacco to be troubled by the
Medicaid suits and the pediatricizing of tobacco policy. The states
have erroneously sought to recover their total smoking-related costs,
and not the incremental cost. The tobacco companies have been
stripped of their traditional defenses, and the issue of tobacco control
has been successfully repositioned as yet another crusade to save the
children. Those who question the means and ends of the crusade are
subject to attack for supporting teenage smoking. The whole affair
has the distinct feel of a lynch mob, hot on the trail of a wanted outlaw
- but for this particular lynching, the state provides the rope, offers up
the victim, and collects most of the reward, and the shredding of civil
liberties is justified by the fact that we are fighting "the powers of
42
darkness".
I suspect my liberal friends would not view these developments
with the same equanimity if the state behaved in a similar fashion
(targeting members of a disfavored group, and changing the law in
One should also not overlook the difficulties of designing an effective ad campaign
intended to explain to teenagers why they should do something that is good for them. The
problem is likely to be particularly acute when, "in a notable shift of marketing strategy,
the No. 2 U.S. tobacco company has launched new advertisements for its much-vilified
cigarettes that challenge anti-smoking activists as killjoys and prudes who deserve defiance
and ridicule." Scott Shane, Cigarette Ads Mock Foes of Tobacco, BALT. SUN, July 12, 1998, at
IA.
42. Cf Gibeaut, Getting Burned, supra note 40, at 42 (noting testimony of Governor
Lawton Chiles that he "didn't care" how lawyers were selected to represent Florida in its
Medicaid suit, didn't know how terms of the contingency fee contract were arrived at, and
it didn't "bother [him a whit] that bill stripping tobacco companies of their traditional
defenses was snuck through the legislature because, "I was fighting the powers of
darkness.").
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the middle of the case to ensure success) in the course of prosecuting
poor African-American criminal defendants in Baltimore City.43 The
prevention of underage smoking is without doubt a "mom and apple
pie" crusade, but we might want to consider whether it is worth
"burn[ing] the house to roast the pig."44

43. Obviously, the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws would prevent some
such conduct, but the growth of civil sanctions not facially subject to such limitations is
suggestive of the possibilities. Of course, the separation of powers implications are equally
troubling. Regardless, one can enact criminal laws with similarly skewed distributional
consequences so long as they have only prospective application - and the concern many
scholars have expressed about the racially skewed distributional implications of the war on
drugs demonstrates the problem is not simply theoretical.
44. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).

